On Oct. 19, 1991, firefighters responded to a small grass fire in the Oakland hills near the western entrance of the Caldecott Tunnel. By evening, crews thought the fire was under control. But the next day, strong wind gusts of nearly 65 mph reignited the brush, generating a raging firestorm.
That Sunday, Sue Piper had just dropped her 4-year-old twins off at a birthday party. "When I came back and I saw the smoke, I said to my 9-year-old, 'You know, I think you should get dressed, don't sit in your pajamas.' I didn't tell her why," Piper remembered. "Meanwhile, it was getting blacker and blacker outside."
The Tunnel Fire, as it's officially known, killed 25 people and destroyed more than 3,000 homes, charring over 1,500 acres. The tragic incident revolutionized how the region thinks about firefighting and fire mitigation at the boundary between urban areas and wildland.
The forest and grasslands near the houses in the East Bay hills have burned many times before — often when hot, dry fall winds have blown through the canyon. Canopied by volatile eucalyptus trees and high atop a ridge, the area is primed for fire.
And in the blustery fall of 1991, the brush and trees surrounding the houses and other structures in the hills were bone-dry after six years of drought conditions — the perfect recipe for a firestorm.
P. Lamont Ewell, Oakland's fire chief at the time, described the harrowing conditions firefighters confronted.
"We had fire that was rushing down," Ewell told KQED in a 1991 interview. "Our main concern is to make sure that our personnel are in a position where they can try and cut the fire off, but not trap themselves. So there was very little that can be done during the major head of the fire."
According to Ewell, the voracious flames spread rapidly in multiple directions while firefighters fought on in spite of their rapidly depleting water supply. The fire had knocked out the pumps that replenish the reservoirs, leaving dozens of firefighters with empty hoses. It took hours before conditions allowed PG&E workers to get close enough to jump-start emergency generators and resupply pressure to water hydrants — a frantic scramble that underscored the neighborhood's precarious infrastructure.
Rethinking everything about firefighting
In the aftermath of the blaze, Oakland's fire officials were forced to rethink everything about firefighting tactics and mitigation. Robert Lipp, now the Oakland Fire Department's assistant chief of technical operations, was a 25-year-old entry-level firefighter at the time.



